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Pentest-AI

Offensive-security CLI and MCP server that re-runs each exploit against a machine oracle before marking a finding verified

B 79/100 GitHub score ? This grade is derived from GitHub signals, not user votes. Open for the full breakdown.
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01 / Summary

About Pentest-AI.

Pentest-AI connects an AI client or model to a penetration-testing workflow for applications you own or are authorized to test. The model helps drive the investigation, and a machine oracle decides whether a finding is verified. It runs as an MCP server for coding agents such as Codex and Claude Code, as a command-line tool with a local Ollama model or a cloud provider, as deterministic checks with no model at all, or as a gate in CI. Findings are stored locally in SQLite.

Verification works in three steps. A probe or scanner flags a candidate, a named oracle repeats the exploit and compares it against a control that should not show the weakness, and a verified finding records the oracle and its results in a portable proof capsule that can be replayed later. For example, a trusted-header bypass must return privileged content with the attack header and deny access without it. The model cannot award a verified verdict, and third-party scanner output stays unverified until an oracle proves it.

A verified verdict applies only to the tested conditions, and a scan with no verified findings is not a full security assessment. Proof capsules are unsigned, so rerunning the check is the trust mechanism. Model-provider calls, installed scanners, and out-of-band callbacks for blind vulnerabilities have their own network behavior, and callbacks can point to your own collaborator server or be disabled.

  • Oracle verification: findings stay candidates until an oracle reproduces the exploit and checks a control
  • Proof capsules: replayable evidence for each verified finding
  • MCP server: engagement, investigation, and verification tools for Codex, Claude Code, and other MCP clients
  • Local models: run with an Ollama model that supports tool calling, with no cloud key
  • Web application probes: injection, access control, request handling, and other application weaknesses
  • Attack chains: multi-step chains checked hop by hop
  • Fix checks: rerun a recorded check against an updated target
  • CI gate: fail a build on verified findings and export SARIF for code-scanning integrations
  • Bundled demo: a vulnerable application to exercise the evidence workflow without a key or external target
  • Local storage: engagement data in SQLite, with opt-in anonymous telemetry

02 / Discussion CREDIBILITY-GATED

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